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Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Vzews of
Criminality:
A Study zn the Role of Social Science
zn Criminal Law Theory
PAUL H. ROBINSON and JOHN M. DARLEY*

Abstract-The authors use social science methodology to determine whether a
doctrinal shift-from an objectivist view of criminality in the common law to a
subjectivist view in modern criminal codes-is consistent with lay intuitions of the
principles of justice. Commentators have suggested that lay perceptions of criminality
have shifted in a way reflected in the doctrinal change, but the study results suggest
a more nuanced conclusion: that the modern lay view agrees with the subjectivist
view of modern codes in defining the minimum requirements of criminality, but
prefers the common law's objectivist view of grading the punishment deserved. The
authors argue that there is practical value in having criminal law track shared
community intuitions of the proper rules for assigning liability and punishment. For
that reason, the study results support the often criticized subjectivist view of modern
codes in setting the minimum requirements of liability, but disapprove of the modern
codes' shift away from the common law's objectivist view of grading.

A central goal of criminal law theory is to understand why criminal law rules
develop and exist as they do. That understanding allows us better to criticize or
support the rules, to determine whether the rules serve their intended purposes,
and to debate the wisdom of those purposes openly. We argue in this article that
social science, properly used, can be an important resource for criminal law
theorists, in both testing and suggesting explanatory theories for criminal law.
We also show how it can provide essential data for the construction and
application of theories of criminal law.
The most beckoning explanatory puzzle in criminal law theory concerns the
variety of rule changes between the common law and modem criminal codes.
Of central importance are those that concern the central questions of the role
of culpable state of mind and of harm in assessing liability and punishment.
Code commentaries and legislative histories often give explanations for specific
* Paul H. Robinson is Professor of Law at Northwestern University. John M. Darley is the Dorman T. Warren
Professor of Psychology at Princeton University. Professor Robinson wishes to acknowledge the support of the
Stanford Clinton, Sr., Research Professorship, and the contributions of participants at a faculty workshop at
Northwestern University School of Law.
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rule changes, some explanations being more enlightening than others. What
criminal law theorists have sought is, first, the identification of a discernible
pattern in the changes, and, second, an explanation for that pattern of change.
Such an understanding can help us to refine modern rules and their application,
as well as to stimulate debate on the propriety of the shift from the common
law rules. It is on this puzzle that we bring to bear the investigative tools of
research psychology. As the reader will see, those tools advance the inquiry in
ways that criminal law theorists on their own could not.
Part 1 of the article offers a traditional theoretical analysis to suggest that
there is a pattern in the rule changes between common law and modern codes.
Drawing from the existing scholarly literature, it also describes one theory for
the doctrinal shifts, what is called a shift from the 'traditionalists' view to that·
of the 'modernists' view. We also offer our own variation on this theory of
doctrinal shift, a shift from what we call an objectivist view of criminality to a
subjectivist view. Social science, we argue, can test theories like these. The article
sets out a series of specific testable empirical questions that are central to the
theoretical debate.
Part 2 describes the social science tools to be used in the testing. In this case,
the primary tool is termed 'scenario research' and the reasons for using it are
given. Part 3 applies the social science test instruments described in Part 2 to
the legal theories developed in Part 1, in order to identify those test results that
indicate that a test subject is taking an objectivist view of criminality and those
that indicate a test subject is taking a subjectivist view. Part 4 reports the results
of the tests and their implications, and answers the questions presented in Part
1. A concluding section offers general observations about the analytic exercise
and its implication for criminal law reform and future social science research.

I. Theories for a Pattern of Criminalization Differences
Between Common Law and Modern Codes
Many changes from common law doctrine to modern criminal codes are easily
explainable as responses to changing conditions. As societal interdependencies
grew, so did the variety of ways in which a person could harm society, its
institutions, or other persons. Thus, new offences were created and old offences
altered to take account of new harms. For example, most modern criminal codes
contain white collar business crimes and special organized crime offences that
did not exist at common law. Other modem criminal code changes are simply
attempts to make criminal law more clear and more comprehensive, as the
legality principle demands. Thus, modern codes typically define commonly used
terms, limit the number of culpability levels used in the definition of offences,
carefully defining each, and codify a comprehensive set of defences. The changes
of greatest interest to criminal law theorists, however, have been those that
suggest some kind of paradigm shift in defining the core of what constitutes
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'criminality', that is, changes that suggest that the foundational substance of the
law has changed not just its form or application.

A. Common Law versus Modern Codes: Doctrinal Shifts
Consider the different views of criminalization that might be suggested by
the following comparisons. The common law recognized an unconvictable
perpetrator defence to complicity, under which the accomplice escaped liability if
the perpetrator was unconvictable (because the perpetrator lacked the culpability
required for the offence, for example). 1 Modem codes typically reject such an
unconvictable perpetrator defence, arguing that an accomplice's liability ought
to depend upon what the accomplice did and the accomplice's state of mind,
and that the perpetrator's defence ought not to alter the accomplice's liability. 2
In the context of conspiracy, the common law defined the agreement requirement as two or more persons agreeing. Not only did the defendant have
to agree with another, the other person genuinely had to agree back. 3 Agreeing
with an undercover agent, for example, did not constitute an adequate agreement
for conspiracy liability. Modem codes typically drop this 'bilateral' agreement
requirement for conspiracy, and simply require that the actor have agreed with
another, termed a 'unilateral' agreement requirement. 4
In the context of attempts, the common law permitted a defence if an actor
attempted an offence that, unknown to the actor, was impossible to complete
1
In Regina v RU:hards [1974) 1 QB 776 (CA, Crim. Div.), defendant wife had hired defendant perpetrators to
beat her husband 'bad enough to put him in the hospital for a month'. Ibid at 778. After beating the husband,
but failing to inflict the type of serious bodily harm the wife had requested, the perpetrators were convicted of
unlawful wounding; the wife as accomplice was, in tum, convicted of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily
harm. On appeal, her conviction was overturned because the only offence committed by the perpetrators was
unlawful wounding, and an accomplice, held the court, 'cannot be guilty of a graver offence than that in fact
which was committed'. Ibid at 780.
2
See, eg Model Penal Code s. 2.06(7):

An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offence and of his complicity therein,
though the person claimed to have committed the offence has not be prosecuted or convicted or has been
convicted of a different offence or degree of offence or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has
been acquitted.
See also Regina v Cogan & Leak [1976) 1 QB 217 (CA, Crim. Div.), in which Leak induced Cogan to rape his
(Leak's) wife. Perpetrator Cogan received a defence for his mistake as to the wife's lack of consent. Leak argued
that he could not be convicted of complicity in the rape as Cogan had not been found guilty due to his mistake.
In rejecting this rationale, the court noted that 'the wife had been raped. Cogan had sexual intercourse with her
without her consent. The fact that Cogan was innocent of rape because he believed that she was consenting does
not affect the position that she was raped.' Ibid at 223.
3
See, eg Arr:hbold v State 397 NE2d 1071 (lnd App 1979), in which the court held that '[t)he offence of
conspiracy does not occur, a crime is not committed, until two or more persons form the intent to commit a
felony. The joint intent is the proscribed conduct.' Ibid at 1073 (emphasis in original).
4
See, eg Model Penal Codes. 5.03(l)(a) and(b).
The unilateral approach makes it immaterial to the guilt of a conspirator whose culpability has been established
that the person or all of the persons with whom he conspired have not been or cannot be convicted. Traditional
law has frequently held otherwise, reasoning from the definition of conspiracy as an agreement between two or
more persons that there must be at least two guilty conspirators or none.
Model Penal Codes. 5.03 comment 398-402 (1985). See also People v Schwimmer 66 AD2d 91, 411 NYS2d 922
(1978), aff'd, 47 NY2d 1004, 420 NYS2d 218, 394 NE2d 288 (1979) (the court held that since the legislature
had adopted a unilateral agreement requirement, the defendant's agreement alone was sufficient to support
conspiracy to steal diamonds, although the co-conspirators were undercover police officers).
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under the circumstances as they actually existed. Thus, the actor who purchased
goods believing them to be stolen, could not be held liable for an attempt to
receive stolen goods where the goods purchased were not, in fact, stolen. 5
Modern codes, in contrast, reject an impossibility defence to all forms of inchoate
liability. An actor's liability is to be determined from the point of view of the
actor, under the circumstances as the actor believed them to be. 6 If the actor
believes that the goods are stolen, he can be held liable for an attempt to purchase
stolen goods.
Also in the context of attempts, the common law adopted a variety of tests
for determining whether an actor's conduct had moved from mere preparation
to criminal attempt. The tests had in common their focus on how close the actor
had come (his or her 'proximity') to completing the offence. 7 Modern codes,
following the Model Penal Code, look instead at how far the actor has gone
from the start of the offence conduct. Once a 'substantial step' is taken, the
actor has shown a willingness to act upon the actor's intention and, therefore,
the actor's conduct is deemed adequate for a criminal attempt. 8 Asking a secretary
to type a letter that is the first of several steps in an elaborate fraud scheme, for
example, would not constitute an attempt at common law, but could constitute
a 'substantial step' sufficient for liability under modern codes.
One may note from these examples that the common law is consistent in
imposing liability only in the instance where there actually (objectively) exists
the danger of the offence harm or evil: by requiring an attempt possible of
completion and, in the context of conspiracy, a true agreement between two
conspirators, for instance. One might term this an objectivist view of criminality,
which sees the gravamen of an offence as its objective harm or evil. It focuses
upon whether the actor's conduct came close to bringing about the harm or evil
of the substantive offence. Where the potential for the harm or evil exists only
in the actor's mind, as is the case in impossible attempts, liability is inappropriate,
hence the common law rule giving a defence for instances of legal impossibility.
Modern codes, in contrast, are willing to impose liability when the actor
believes that he or she is committing or participating in a criminal offence. Under
what might be called this subjectivist view of criminality, the focus is not on the
harm or evil of the offence but upon the actor's subjective culpability in attempting
to bring it about. Coming close to a substantive harm or evil is not required.
The question is whether the actor has gone far enough to demonstrate that his
or her intention is fully formed and resolute, hence the requirement of a
5
See, eg People v Jaffe 185 NY 497, 78 NE 169 (1906), in which impossibility was held to be a defence to the
receipt of stolen property where the goods had been 'wholly within [the owners'] control [at the time of sale] and
[were] offered to the defendant by their authority'. Ibid at 499, 78 NEat 169.
6
See, eg Model Penal Codes. 5.01(1)(a).
7
The common law proximity tests include the most-often encountered 'dangerous proximity test', which
requires a consideration of (1) the gravity of the offence intended, (2) the nearness of the act to completion of
the crime, and (3) the probability that the conduct will result in the offence intended. See, eg Commonwealth v
Peaslee 177 Mass 267, 59 NE 55 (1901) ('a mere collection and preparation of materials in a room for the purpose
of setting fire to them, unaccompanied by any present intent to set the fire, would be too remote', ibid at 273, 59
NEat 57).
8
See, eg Model Penal Codes. 5.01 (1)(c).
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'substantial step.' Similarly, while the actor's attempt may be impossible, it
nonetheless may be adequate to show the actor's willingness to commit the
offence.
The same common law-modem code conflict, between an objectivist and
subjectivist view of criminality, can be seen in determining the importance that
attaches to the close risk or actual occurrence of the offence. A logical extension
of the subjectivist view of criminality suggests that there ought to be little or no
significance given to whether the harm or evil of an offence actually occurs. If
the primary focus of liability is the actor's subjective culpability, the important
facts are what the actor has done in furtherance and as expression of that
culpability (and the level of the actor's culpable state of mind at the time of the
offence). Whether the harm or evil intended or risked actually occurs does not
alter the actor's subjective culpability.
The objectivist view, in contrast, would insist on greater punishment where
the harm or evil occurs, for it is the gravamen of the offence. While the objectivist
might be persuaded to impose liability on the actor who comes close to bringing
about the harm or evil, it seems clear that the objectivist would think that still
greater liability is due where the harm or evil in fact occurs.
Thus the subjectivist-objectivist perspectives generate important differences
in the criminal rules governing grading of offences. As it did with regard to
minimum requirements for liability, the Model Penal Code generally takes a
subjectivist view of criminality in grading. With a few exceptions, the Code's
view is that the actual occurrence of a harm and evil ought not be significant.
The actor's liability ought to depend only on the actor's culpable state of mind
manifested in conduct. The most important provision implementing this view
with respect to grading is Model Penal Codes. 5.05(1), which grades inchoate
offences as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are
crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offence which is attempted
or solicited or is an object of the conspiracy. An attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to
commit a [capital crime or a] felony of the first degree is a felony of the second degree.•

Thus, except for attempted murder and attempted aggravated rape, all other
attempts, for example, attempted arson, attempted sexual assault, are graded
the same as the completed offence. The traditional view, reflected in the objectivist
common law, was to punish the inchoate offence less than the completed
offence. 10
Similarly reflecting the Model Penal Code's subjectivist grading philosophy is
the Code's complicity provision, which treats unsuccessful attempts to aid a
9
Model Penal Code s. 5.05(1). Note that, while the Model Penal Code drafters adopt a subjective view of
grading in the first sentence of this provision, they seem unwilling to take that view to its logical conclusion. In
the last sentence, they make clear that attempted murder will get a reduction in grade from murder under the
same circumstances.
10
See, eg 2 James Fitzjames Stephens, A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) at 224 {attempt to
commit any felony was misdemeanour).
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perpetrator as complicity, for which full substantive liability is imposed. 11 The
Code's provision holds an actor as an accomplice if he 'aids or agrees or attempts
to aid' in the commission of an offence. 12 Thus, an unfulfilled agreement or
unsuccessful attempt to assist or encourage is graded the same as the substantive
offence. The actor who agrees to stand watch for a perpetrator bent on arson is
liable for arson even if he gets the date confused and does not show up. In other
words, inchoate complicity is punished not as inchoate liability but as full
substantive liability. At common law, an unsuccessful attempt to aid would not
constitute complicity in the substantive offence. 13

B. A Theory for the Doctrinal Shifts: Objectivist versus Subjectivist Vtews
of Criminality
To oversimplify, the distinction between what we have called an 'objectivist' and
a 'subjectivist' view of criminality might be stated this way: The objectivist view
maintains that the occurrence of the harm or evil defined by the offence is highly
relevant; the subjectivist view maintains that such harm or evil is irrelevant; only
the actor's culpable state of mind regarding the occurrence of the harm or evil
is important. 14
The labels tend to overstate a rather subtle distinction. The 'objectivist' or
'harmful consequences' view is not so objective as to require that the harm or
evil of the offence actually occur in order to impose liability. The objectivist
imposes liability for inchoate conduct, as, for example, when the actor comes
close to bringing about a real offence harm or evil. 15 The 'subjectivist' view, in
tum, is not so subjective as to only require a culpable state of mind. An intention
alone is insufficient for liability; some act is required to prove the actor's
willingness to act upon, to externalize, his or her subjective culpability. 16 And,
while the occurrence of the harm or evil may not be important to the subjectivist,
the nature of the harm or evil intended or risked is important to determine the
degree of the actor's culpability. Intending to cause death is more serious. than
intending to rob someone.
11

See Model Penal Code s. 2.06(1), (2), (3)(a)(ii).
Model Penal Code s. 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (emphasis added).
Stephens, above n 10 at 234--7.
14
Other writers have observed a similar distinction, although they would not necessarily characterize it as we
do here. See, eg Lawrence Crocker, 'Justice in Criminal liability: Decriminalizing Hannless Attempts' 53 Ohio
St L Rev 1057 (1992) (comparing 'subjective' and 'objective' 'theories of criminal liability'); George P. Fletcher,
Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) at 135-44, 389, 472-83 (referring to three 'patterns of liability': 'subjective',
'harmful consequences', and 'manifest').
15
Generally, a 'hann' or a 'harmful result' is used in this article to refer to a tangible or intangible consequence
of conduct, such as those consequences described in the result elements of offence definitions. 'Evil' conduct is
used to refer to conduct that is objectionable and prohibited for its own sake rather than because it brings about
a prohibited harmful consequence. Taken together, the 'hann and evil' of crimes is meant to include all prohibitions
of the criminal law. The phrase 'hann and evil' is sometimes used in this article as shorthand for 'the occurrence
of hann and evil'.
16
For further discussion of this function of the act requirement, see Paul H. Robinson, 'Should the Criminal
Law Abandon the Actus Reus-Mens Rea Distinction?' in S. Shute, J. Gardner and J. Horder (eds), Criminal Law:
Action, Value and Struccure (Oxford, 1993).
12

13
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At least one writer has noted a similar distinction between the common
law and modem codes and labeled the opposing views as 'traditionalist' and
'modernist'. 17 Common law is said to reflect the objectivist view of the 'traditionalists', where the gravamen of an offence is its resulting harm or evil. The
'modernist' subjectivist view of criminality, in contrast, focuses upon the actor's
culpable state of mind towards bringing about the offence harm or evil, without
regard for whether the harm or evil actually occurs. George Fletcher explains:
The traditionalists root their case in the way we feel about crime and suffering.
Modernists hold to arguments of rational and meaningful punishment. Despite what
we might feel, the modernist insists, reason demands that we limit the criminal law to
those factors that are within the control of the actor. The occurrence of harm is beyond
his control and therefore ought not to have weight in the definition of crime and fitting
punishment. The tension between these conflicting schools infects virtually all of our
decisions in designing a system of crime and punishment. 18

Recall the comparison of common law and modem code rules relating to
minimum requirements. Each of these common law rules reflects a 'traditionalist'
common law consistent in imposing liability only where an offence harm or evil
or a credible danger of one actually exists. Completion of an attempt must be
possible and must almost materialize; a conspiracy must be a true agreement
between two actual conspirators; an accomplice must actually assist a real
perpetrator. Where the potential for the harm or evil exists only in the actor's
mind or is remote or speculative, traditionalists view the assignment of liability
as inappropriate.
The subjective 'modernist' view focuses upon the actor's intention to bring
about the offence harm or evil. An actor need not come close to a substantive
harm or evil of the offence; he need only engage in some conduct, a 'substantial
step', toward that end, to demonstrate his willingness to act upon his intention.
Completion of an attempt need not be possible, provided that the actor thinks
it is possible. The co-conspirator need not actually agree with the actor, provided
that the actor thinks he does. The perpetrator need not actually commit an
offence, provided that the accomplice thinks that he will.

C. An Alternative Theory of Current Laws Vzew of Criminality
As Fletcher conceives of it, a person is either a 'traditionalist' or a 'modernist'.
One either thinks that the occurrence of harm or evil is important to criminal
liability, as the common law makers apparently did, or one thinks that it is not,
as modem code drafters apparently think. While we agree that the distinction is
valuable-what we call an objectivist versus a subjectivist view of criminality-we
think that Fletcher's characterization of it is unnecessarily dichotomous. His
traditionalist-modernist distinction is misleading because it incorrectly suggests
that one must be either an objectivist or a subjectivist on all issues. In fact, we
17
18

George P. Fletchet; A Crime of Self Defence: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial ( 1988) at 64.
Ibid at 64
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will argue, it is possible to be a subjectivist on some issues but an objectivist on
others. Specifically, we will argue that it would be logically coherent to advocate
a subjectivist view of the minimum requirements of liability but simultaneously
to take an objectivist view of grading.
If fact, we suggest that this is what ordinary people do. Thus, we carry out
this argument about legal doctrines in what is an unusual way. We empirically
investigate the liability assignment rules held by ordinary people in the community. We claim that, from the community's view of liability and punishment,
the common law's objectivist view was too demanding in setting the minimum
requirements of liability, as in defining inchoate offences. At the same time,
subjectivist modem codes miss the mark when they take a subjectivist view in
grading, as in ignoring the significance of resulting harm and evil. If we can
demonstrate this, we certainly will have demonstrated that the distinction we
propose is an important one to make.

D. Testable Empirical Issues
If this were a criminal law theory paper, this is where the analysis would end or
at least would shift to a variety of forms of speculation. But the disagreements
here are to some extent disagreements about how people think, essentially
empirical claims. With the help of social science, we can collect and analyse data
that may sketch real answers.
The discussion raises these testable empirical issues:

(1) Do people take an objectivist view, as the common law did, on both
grading and minimum requirements issues, or do they prefer a subjectivist view,
as modem criminal codes seem to? That is, are people of today Fletcher's
'traditionalists' or, as Fletcher would seem to predict by his labeling, 'modernists'?
(2) Are people consistent in the view they take? That is, do they stick to an
objectivist view, or a subjectivist view, in a variety of situations? Or do they
switch back and forth in a way that suggests that they cannot properly be
characterized as taking either view?
(3) If people are not consistently 'traditionalists' or 'modernists,' as Fletcher
predicts, is there nonetheless a discernible pattern in their use of an objectivist
or a subjectivist view? Do people take a subjectivist view in judging the minimum
requirements for liability and an objectivist view in grading, as we hypothesize?
Or does the pattern follow a different principle? Or, is there no underlying
pattern to peoples' liability preferences, as some writers would seem to
·expect? 19 The next section describes how these empirical questions can be
answered.

10

Some writers have suggested that criminal law has few underlying patterns. See, eg Stephen Schulhofer,
'Book Review' 68 CalL Rev 181 (1980) (reviewing George Fletcher's Rethinking Criminal Law).
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2. Tools for Testing the Criminal Law Theories:
Social Psychology Scenario Research
A. Scenarios and Measures
There are a number of methods that can be used to probe lay judgments about
complex issues, and the one we chose to use in this study was the 'scenario or
vignette method'. Subjects are presented with a short description of a person's
conduct, and are asked whether and, if so, how much liability and punishment
the actor should receive for the conduct. Subjects are next given another scenario,
and assess liability and punishment for that actor, then another scenario, and so
on. The scenarios are varied by the researchers in ways driven by the theories
being tested, and the researcher examines the differences between the liabilities
assigned to each scenario.
Rather than having the subjects assign ratings to what can quite quickly
become a large number of differing scenarios, why not just ask the subjects
whether they think a subjectivist or an objectivist view of criminality is appropriate
for the legal issues we are concerned with? Because psychologists have discovered
that subjects often do not have mental access to the principles and processes
they use to make decisions, and thus cannot accurately articulate those principles.
Instead, researchers present subjects with various cases to judge, and infer their
judging principles from the resulting patterning of responses between the different
cases
This is what we did in the present research. We presented subjects with cases
to judge in the form of short scenario descriptions of potentially criminal actions.
Because the focus of our research was on contrasting various versions of the
subjectivist and objectivist approaches to liability assignments, we designed the
variations in our scenarios to reflect those different approaches. Generally, two
cases differed in a way that would 'make a difference' to, for instance, a person
with an objectivist view but not to a person with a subjectivist view. 'Make a
difference' here means that the two cases would generate different liability
judgments if the subject took one view of criminality, but not if he or she took
the other view.
One way of summarizing the implications of the various aspects of the research
design is to say that we conducted an experiment designed to determine whether
the experimental respondents took an objectivist or subjectivist stance on issues
of grading of offences and minimum requirements for offences. Experimentation
is an unusual tactic in research concerning legal issues; other empirical techniques
such as the examination of existing records or other archival procedures, or
opinion surveys, are more common. Part of what we seek to demonstrate to
criminal law theorists and code drafters is that this most rigorous form of
scientific research, experimentation, can be brought to bear on their issues of
debate.
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Subjects first read a paragraph of core information that gave the background
to the various scenarios:
Please keep this general description of John in mind as you answer the following cases.
Remember, you are always assigning a punishment to the character named John. In
some of the scenarios other persons also deserve punishment, but we are not concerned
with measuring that. We are only concerned with the punishment you would assign
John.
Next they read a specific scenario and assign a liability to the perpetrator
described in it. For instance, the murder scenario read as follows:
John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of John's father for
income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his father's life and his
own, and is intent on taking revenge. John buys an easily concealed gun, planning to
confront and kill Paul in the parking lot of his office. As prosecutor Paul approaches
his car in the parking lot of his office, John, standing several yards away, shoots and
kills him. The sound of the gunfire draws security guards, who arrest John.
This is obviously a case of murder, and we use it to establish the sentence that
the subject would give to murder committed in these particular circumstances.
It is not likely to get different liability responses from objectivists and subjectivists.
It provides a point of comparison for later cases-to see whether subjects thought
the subsequent case deserved less liability and punishment than a straight murder
case. No doubt some people will give higher punishment than others; for example,
some may give the death penalty, while others, who are opposed to its use, will
not. But using the experimental design we have chosen, whether the subject is
a generally harsh or an easy sentencer, which is not the focus of our concerns,
can be functionally excluded from our analysis. Our interest is in the difference
in liability between specific scenarios, not the absolute amount of liability in any
scenario.
As noted above, scenarios differ in ways designed to elicit one· pattern of
liability assignments if the subject takes an objectivist view, and another if the
subject takes a subjectivist view. For instance, a second scenario read as follows:
John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of John's father for
income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his father's life and his
own, and is intent on taking revenge. John buys an easily concealed gun, planning to
confront and kill Paul in the parking lot of his office. As prosecutor Paul approaches
his car in the parking lot of his office, John, standing several yards away, shoots at him
but misses. The sound of the gunfire draws security guards, who arrest John before
he can get another shot at Paul.
The contrast between the two cases is clear: in both the intent is to murder, but
in the second case the murder does not succeed, the harm has not occurred.
Therefore the subjectivist should assign similar liability to both cases, while the
objectivist would assign lower liability to the second case.
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Notice that we have attempted, and we hope succeeded, in making the two
scenarios differ in only one way, the way that is relevant to the theoretical
comparison in question. The subjects perceive the different scenarios as having
the same overall characteristics, so that any differences in liabilities assigned can
be attributed to the one characteristic that is varied between the contrasting
scenarios.
The task of each subject, then, in response to each scenario was to assign a
degree of liability and punishment to the protagonist in the scenario-in their
view, to assign punishment to a wrong-doer. Subjects did this by marking their
judgment on the scale shown below, a scale with which they quickly became
familiar:
N
0
2
3
4
5
No
Liability 1 day 2 wks 2 mo. 6 mo. 1yr
liability but no
punishment

7
6
8
9
3yrs 7yrs 15 yrs 30 yrs

10
11
Death
Life
imprisonment

As can be seen, the scale gives subjects a choice of assigning no criminal liability
to the protagonist, liability but no punishment, and 11 levels of punishment,
prison sentences ranging from 1 day in jail to the death penalty. Notice that the
length of the prison sentences increases differentially as the assigned punishments
increase. For instance, an assignment of punishment level 2 is an assignment of
14 days in prison, an increase of only 13 days over punishment level 1. An
assignment of punishment level 9 is a 15-year increase from the punishment
represented by level 8. We constructed the scale in this way for two reasons:
First, and primarily, because the differences corresponded to the differences in
grading categories used in typical American criminal codes. Second, because the
differences corresponded, roughly at least, to what ordinary people perceive as
equal differences between sentences. Thus these sorts of differences are the ones
available to code drafters when they decide how to grade an offence, the ones
juries and judges must deal with when sentencing a convicted offender, and
perhaps the ones that come to the mind of citizens when they read and think
about criminal sentences. 20
In designing the scenarios, our task was to create as many as were needed to
provide a reasonably complete test of the issues listed at the end of Section I.
We found that 14 scenarios were needed. The full text of these scenarios are
presented in the Appendix to this article. Some involve unconvictable perpetrator
defences, an issue marked as an important test between the different theories of
liability assignment, others involve variations in an actor's steps towards committing a crime, another area of difference. The exact differences at issue in
contrasts between various scenarios we will describe in detail in Section Ill.
20

The scale used here is the same as the one developed and first used in Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley,
Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law (1995), in which we report the results of a
number of srudies that map the community's perceptions of the appropriate liabilities to assign in various criminal
siruations. For a more lengthy discussion of the scale and its properties, see ibid at 223-5.
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Pilot testing indicated that 14 cases could be read and evaluated by a subject
in approximately half an hour. Further, the subjects were able to maintain
concentration; their reports indicated that they found the task quite interesting,
and were intrigued by thinking about what differences in cases 'made a difference'
to them.
As this indicates, all of our subjects responded to all of the cases. In the
experimental design literature, this is referred to as a 'within-subjects design'.
This design focuses the subjects' attention on the differences between the
scenarios. The danger is that they think that the existence of a difference implies
an instruction from the researcher that the difference should 'make a difference';
that it should provoke different liability assignments from the subject. 21 To
counter this possibility, we told subjects that we did not expect that different
scenarios necessarily should get different liability judgments, and that they were
to give us their own judgments about what differences mattered. Looking over
the individual response protocols, we noted that subjects did rate some cases
alike as to the liabilities they generated.
As is usual in these designs, the order in which the cases were given to the
subjects was randomized. To make the subjects' contrast task simpler for them,
cases with one dimension of variation were grouped together. The order of cases
within those groups was randomized, and the order in which the groups were
presented was also randomized. Randomization prevents results from being
dependent upon the order in which the scenarios were judged.

B. The Sample of Subjects
Any research study must select subjects from the population about which the
research generalizations are intended to apply. Our concern is with the moral
intuitions of the community of citizens governed by the laws in question. Since
criminal laws are generally state laws, sometimes this consideration has guided
us to select subjects from a particular state. Given that this research is about
patterns of change in the rationale for criminal sentencing that exist at the
national level, eventually one would want to construct a national sample of
subjects. For this initial study of the issue, we were influenced by limitations
imposed by practical considerations, and selected one set of our subjects from
lists of jury-eligible citizens in a town in New Jersey. 22 The second set consisted
of college students. who are readily available for research. It is sometimes
suggested that they are 'atypical', in that their responses would differ from
'ordinary people'. Since we had both students and 'ordinary people' in our
research, we were able to test this contention.
We tested 27 students with an average age of 19.2 years and 21 jury-eligible
community members with an average age of 50.8 years. Men and women were
21
For a fuller discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of within-subjects designs in this sort of research, see
ibid at 221-2.
22
Some 56% of those contacted to participate agreed to do so. This rather high rate of agreement was probably
the result of the subjects' agreement with our explanation of the goals of the research.
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equally represented in both samples, as were the major religious denominations
of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. 23 Most in both samples identified themselves
as politically moderate, with the students leaning a little more to the liberal side
of the continuum. Students filled out the questionnaires in a room on campus;
for the community members, questionnaires were mailed out to them, and
occasionally after a telephone reminder, the questionnaires were mailed back to
us. As expected, conservatives assigned slightly higher liabilities to the various
scenarios we presented. Our jury-eligible community members also assigned
slightly higher liabilities, over and above the fact that conservatives did so. What
is important, for our purposes, is that the two groups of subjects did not show
any significant difference in their pattern of relative liability assigned among the
scenanos.

3. Identifying Objectivist versus Subjectivist Views of
Criminality
Before performing the testing described in Part 2, we determined how an
'objectivist' and a 'subjectivist' would each respond to the test instrument. By
comparing the actual responses to these benchmarks, we could determine whether
a subject's response reflected an objectivist or subjectivist view of criminality, or
something else.
Below we consider each scenario in tum. (Recall that the subjects did not
receive the scenarios in this order; each received them in a different order.)
In scenario 1, the actor shoots and kills the victim, a simple completed conduct
murder case. This case is meant to serve as a point of comparison to other cases
below.
In scenario 2, the actor shoots to kill and misses, a completed conduct but
failed attempt. The conduct and intention are the same as in scenario 1. The
only difference is that the death does not occur. The objectivist will impose
liability reduced from that of the murder case because of the absence of the
death. The subjectivist will not; the fortuitous failure to cause death does not
make the actor less fit for liability in the subjectivist view. 24
In scenario 3, the actor aims to shoot the victim but intervention by another
person prevents the shooting. It is a case of an incomplete-conduct attempt, but
one where the actor has come within a 'dangerous proximity' of the offence, as
one of the common law tests of attempt would describe it. The objectivist would
give a reduction in liability, perhaps more than the reduction given in scenario
2 for the completed conduct offence, because here the actor was further from
23

Two of each sample were African-Americans, for a total of four in a panel of 48.
For attempted murder, the Model Penal Code makes an exception to its general rule that attempts are graded
the same as the completed offence. See Model Penal Codes. 5.05(1) (second sentence). This is the most obvious
exception that the Code makes in implementing its subjectivist view of criminality in the context of grading. For
a discussion of why the drafters may have caved in on this particular application, see Paul H. Robinson, 'The
Role of Harm and Evil in Criminal Law: A Study in Legislative Deception?' 5 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues
299-322 (1994) [hereinafter, Harm and Evil].
24
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completing the offence. The subjectivist will give no reduction in liability, as in
the case of the completed conduct attempt in scenario 2.
In scenario 4, the actor agrees with another that they will kill the victim, they
go to look for a gun for that purpose. It is a case of a bilateral-agreement
conspiracy, with no completed offence. The objectivist will be sceptical of this
case; the conduct is even farther from the completed offence than in the
'dangerous proximity' attempt of scenario 3. Perhaps it is too far to merit liability,
but, on the other hand, the objectivist may see the group criminality here as a
harm in itself. The actor has succeeded in forming at a criminal group. Thus,
the objectivist may conclude that some liability is in order, albeit much reduced.
The subjectivist will have no difficulty in finding adequate grounds for liability
in this scenario. The actor has shown his illicit intention and his willingness to
act upon it, thus no reduction in liability.
In scenario 5, the actor gives a gun to the person fighting with the victim
hoping that the person will kill the victim, which he does. Current legal doctrine
will consider this a case of complicity in murder. The objectivist is likely to
reduce liability from that of scenario 1 because the actor's causal contribution
is less than when he does the killing himself. The subjectivist will see the actor's
intention to kill and his externalization of that intention and will impose full
liability, the same as that in scenario 1, just as current doctrine formally does.
In scenario 6, the actor gets a gun to help the person shoot to kill, but the
person never receives the gun; he finds his own, then shoots and kills the victim.
It is a case of attempted but failed complicity to a successful offence. The
objectivist will give reduced liability for both of the reasons noted in scenarios
2, 3, and 5. There is a death but the actor has no causal contribution to it, thus
analogous to scenarios 2 and 3; also he is not himself the perpetrator but only
an accomplice, as in scenario 5. Thus, liability is likely to be even less than
scenario 2 or 3 or 5. The subjectivist will impose the same liability as in scenario
1; the actor intends to kill and has acted upon that intention.
In scenario 7, the actor shoots at a target, knowing there might be a person
in the overshot zone, and kills a person. It is a case of reckless homicide,
manslaughter. The objectivist will reduce liability from that in scenario 1. Recall
that the objectivist does not exclude the significance of an actor's culpability.
Rather, the objectivist-subjectivist distinction is primarily driven by the subjectivist's rejection of the significance of objective factors-like resulting harm,
or proximity to the completed offence. The subjectivist similarly will reduce
liability because of reduced culpability, thus this case will be of no help in
distinguishing the two views of criminality (but it will serve as a control case for
scenario 8, which will distinguish).
In scenario 8, the actor shoots at a target, knowing, as in scenario 7, that there
might be a person in the overshot zone, but in this instance luckily no person is
killed. It is a case of endangerment. The objectivist will give reduced liability
from that in scenario 7, where the death occurs. The subjectivist will not. The
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comparison is analogous to that between scenarios 1 and 2, but at a lower
culpability level. 25
These eight scenarios present issues of grading; they test factors that might
alter the grade of an actor's liability, but that are not likely to exculpate the actor
from liability. In each instance, both objectivist and subjectivist are likely to
agree that some liability is appropriate; the question is how much. In the next
six cases there is some question whether or not liability should be imposed at
all. They raise issues of the minimum requirements of liability.
In scenario 9, the actor gets a gun with the intention of going to find and kill
the victim, but gets no further than this preliminary first step. It is what the
Model Penal Code would call a case of 'substantial step' attempt. The objectivist
would be troubled by the case; the actor's conduct is so far from the completed
offence that it may not be sufficient for liability at all. Recall that the common
law would give a defence in this case. The subjectivist would find adequate
grounds for liability in the actor's intention to kill and his willingness to act
upon that intention. The subjectivist who is a subjectivist in grading as well
would give no defence. The subjectivist who is an objectivist in grading will
want to give a discount, as was given in scenario 2, but greater here because the
conduct is further from the offence. Indeed, the liability reduction probably
would be greater than that in scenario 3 because the substantial step attempt
here is further from the offence than the dangerous proximity attempt there.
Scenario 9 introduces a point of complexity in the analysis. If we are correct
in our prediction that the ordinary person is an objectivist on grading issues but
a subjectivist on minimum requirements for liability, then for each of the scenarios
testing minimum requirements issues, scenarios 9 to 14, we would suggest two
different reactions from subjectivists depending upon whether a person is a 'pure
subjectivist,' a subjectivist in both minimum requirements and grading, and an
'objectivist-grading subjectivist', who shows the kind of discrimination that we
predict, taking a subjectivist view in assessing the minimum requirements for
liability but, once liability is to be imposed, reverts to an objectivist view in
determining the amount of punishment.
In scenario 10, the actor shoots the victim, as in scenario 1, but the 'victim'
turns out to be only a wax doll of the intended victim. It is a case of a completed
conduct but factually impossible attempt. The objectivist will be troubled by
this case. There was no real danger of commission. So a complete defence might
be in order. On the other hand, this seems like more worrisome conduct. Unlike
the legally impossible attempt to be discussed in scenario 13, it will be apparent
to all observers here that the actor intended to kill the victim. The objectivist
might reason that this kind of impossible attempt is itself a societal harm because
it causes anxiety, invites retaliation by others, and generally destabilizes society.
25
Despite its claim that the occurrence or absence of resulting harm ought not to influence the grade of the
offence, as reflected in its grading of attempts the same as the substantive offence, the Model Penal Code does in
fact grade endangerment dramatically less than reckless homicide (manslaughter). Compare Model Penal Code
s. 210.3(1)(a) and (2) (manslaughter a second degree felony) to s. 211.2 (endangerment a misdemeanour). For
a discussion and theory on why, see Robinson, Harm and Evil, above n. 24 at 312-22.

Table I. Identifying objectivist and subjectivist responses

Scenario

Objectivist will say:

Subjectivist will say:
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GRADING CASES

1. Shoot to kill and kill-completed
conduct murder-control
2. Shoot to kill and miss-completed
conduct but failed attempt
3. Aiming gun but intervention before
shoots-proximity but incomplete
conduct
4. Agrees with another that they will kill
the victim, they go to look for a
gun-bilateral conspiracy, no completed
offence
5. Gives gun to person fighting with
victim hoping will kill, perpetrator does
then shoot and kill-complicity in murder
6. Gets gun to help person shoot to kill,
but person never receives gun, perpetrator
has to find his own gun, then shoots and
kills-failed complicity, successful offence
7. Shoots at target, knowing there might
be persons in the overshot zone,
kills-manslaughter
8. Shoots at target, knowing there might
be persons in the overshot zone, but
luckily none-endangerment
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2. Reduced grade

3. Perhaps further reduction from no. 2
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4. Probably less liability than no. 3 (and
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from completed offence
5. Murder, but reduce liability to the
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less
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causal contribution

7. Reduced grade from no. 1 (because
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9. Gets gun with intention to go to find
the victim and kills-substantial step,
incomplete conduct
10. Shoots as in no. 1 but person turns
out to be a life-like dummy of the
intended victim-completed conduct,
factually impossible attempt
11. Same as no. 4 but other is
undercover officer-unilateral conspiracy,
no completed offence
12. Smuggles cocaine-control case for
no. 13
13. Believes smuggling cocaine but only
talcum powder----<:ompleted conduct,
legally impossible attempt
14. Gives gun to person fighting with
victim who then kills, as in no. 5, but
perpetrator turns out to be a person who
is acting and killing in selfdefence-assisting unconvictable
perpetrator
o-g-sbj =objectivist-grading subjectivist.
p-sbj =pure subjectivist.

9. Complete defence

10. Tempted to give complete defence,
but perhaps some reduced liability
because the appearance of an attempt can
be a societal harm in itself
11. Complete defence

12. Smuggling control case
13. Complete defence

14. Complete defence

9. p-sbj-no reduction, as in no. 2;
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In fact, the common law history reflects uncertainty on these kinds of cases,
initially providing a complete defence but subsequently allowing liability but at
a reduced level. 26 The subjectivist, as in the other attempt cases will easily find
the manifested intention and the willingness to act upon it as adequate grounds
for liability. The 'pure subjectivist', who is a subjectivist in grading as well, will
provide no reduction, as with all inchoate conduct. The 'objectivist-grading
subjectivist', who is an objectivist on grading issues, will give a reduction in
liability because of the absence of the offence harm, as in scenario 2, which is
also a completed conduct attempt.
In scenario 11, the actor conspires with another to kill the victim, as in scenario
4, but the other conspirator in this instance is an undercover police officer, so
there was never any real danger of the offence being committed. The case is one
of unilateral conspiracy with no completed offence. The absence of any danger
of commission makes the offence analogous to that of an impossible attempt.
This will trouble the objectivist, as it did the common law, which gave it a
complete defence. The subjectivist will be comfortable imposing liability here,
as in scenario 4. The pure subjectivist will again give full liability; the objectivistgrading subjectivist will give the same reduction in liability given in scenario 4,
because of the absence of the intended death.
In scenario 12, the actor smuggles cocaine. It is a control case, like scenario
1, in this instance providing a point of comparison for scenario 13. (The issue
being tested here-legally impossible attempt--does not arise in result element
offences, such as homicide, hence the need to switch to a different base offence.)
In scenario 13, the actor believes he is smuggling cocaine but in fact is only
carrying talcum powder. This is a case of a completed conduct legally impossible
attempt. The objectivist will give a complete defence because the danger of
commission of an offence existed only in the actor's mind (and here, unlike the
case of factually impossible attempt, there is not the same potential for triggering
public anxiety or private retaliation). The subjectivist will not provide a defence.
The pure subjectivist will give the same liability as given in scenario 12. The
objectivist-grading subjectivist will reduce liability out of recognition of the
absence of the offence harm. It will be a reduction proportionate to that given
in scenario 10, 27 because the difference between a factually and a legally impossible
attempt will be of little significance to the subjectivist (as it is irrelevant in
modem codes).
In scenario 14, the actor hopes to have the victim killed by giving a gun to a
person fighting with victim; the person does use it to kill the victim, as occurred
in scenario 5, but in this instance the killer turns out to be acting in lawful selfdefence. Thus, it is a case of assisting an unconvictable perpetrator. The objectivist
will give a complete defence. The killing is analogous to an impossible attempt,
26
For a statement of the old rule, see Regina v Collins 9 Cox CC 497 at 499 (1864). English law now rejects
all forms of impossibility as a defence. See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (1991) at 405-6.
27
We say 'proportionate' because we would expect that the murder will have a higher liability than the smuggling,
thus we would expect that the actual amount of the discount in the smuggling case would be proponionately less.
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where the actor wants to commit an offence but, because of circumstances
unknown to him, is legally unable to do so. 28 He in fact helped a person do the
right thing. 29 As in scenario 13, the objectivist gives a complete defence to a
legally impossible attempt. The actor may have had the culpability required for
the offence, but there was no real danger of the offence being committed. The
danger only existed in the actor's mind. The subjectivist will impose liability:
the pure subjectivist giving full liability, as in all inchoate offences; the objectivistgrading subjectivist will give a discount analogous to that of the completed
conduct attempt in scenario 2, plus a discount similar to that in scenario 5
because the actor is only an accomplice, not the perpetrator.
Table I summarizes these analyses.

4. The Results and Their Implications for the Questions
Presented
A. The Results
The liability results of the study are reported in Table II. The second column
reports for each scenario the mean of subjects' responses assigned to that scenario
on the liability scale described in Part 2. Recall that each point on the scale
corresponds to about one grade in the average American criminal code grading
scheme. For scenario 1, the straight murder case, liability is predictably high,
10.10. Using this as a reference, we can see whether subjects impose less liability
in other cases and, if so, how much less. 30

(i) Issues of offence grading
Consider the first eight scenarios, in which everyone would agree that some
liability is appropriate; the only issue is what degree ofliability should be imposed.
Those who take a subjectivist view of grading offences will regard scenarios 2
to 6 as equivalent to murder. In all of them, an intent was formed and displayed,
and the intent was to commit murder. Those taking an objectivist view, in which
the occurrence of harm and other considerations are taken into account for the
reasons discussed in Part 3 (see Table 1), will see these offences as calling for
less liability than the prototypical murder case.
28

For a discussion of this analogy, see Paul H. Robinson, 'Competing Theories of Justification: Competing
Theories of]ustification: Deeds vs Reasons' in A.T.H. Smith and A. Simester (eds) Current Problems of Criminal
Theory (Oxford, 1996) at 45-70.
29
The reader will later hear that the subjects may have perceived this scenario in a way different from that
which we intended; our intended meaning is described in the text here. See the later discussion at text before n.
32.
30
Our task is to examine for differences between the average assignments of liability to two or more cases. The
question immediately arises concerning which differences are real, and which might have been produced by some
random process such as a succession of coin flips. The custom in social science research is to treat differences
that could have occurred only five times out of 100 by chance as not produced by chance, and as 'real' and
therefore interpretable differences. All of the differences that we discuss and interpret could occur only one time
out of 100, unless we note otherwise.
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Table II. Liability results and their objectivist-subjectivist implications

Grading (G)
or minimum
requirements
(MR) case?

Consistent
with
objectivist
view?

Consistent
with
subjectivist
view?

10.10
8.38

G

Yes

No

7.33

G

Yes

No

6.06

G

Yes

No

8.60
6.35

G
G

Yes
Yes

No
No

7.15

G

Yes

Yes

5.28
5.73

G
MR

Yes
No

No
Yes (obj-grd)

7.94

MR

Yes

Yes (obj-grd)

6.29

MR

No

Yes (obj-grd)

7.40
5.06

MR

No

Yes

9.0

MR

No

Yes (objgrd)*

Scenario

Mean

(I) Murder
(2) Completed conduct
attempted murder
(3) Incomplete conduct
(proximity) attempt in murder
(4) Bilateral inchoate
conspiracy
(5) Complicity in murder
(6) Failed complicity in
murder
(7) Manslaughter (reckless
homicide)
(8) Endangerment
(9) Incomplete conduct
(substantial step) attempt to
murder
(10) Completed conduct
factually impossible attempted
murder
(11) Unilateral inchoate
conspiracy
(12) Smuggling cocaine
(13) Legally impossible attempt
to smuggle cocaine
(14) Mistaken belief of
complicity in murder

obj-grd =subjectivist of the objectivist-grading type.
* But see text discussion concerning scenario 14.

The results of the study tell a simple story: the objectivist view of grading is
the one adopted by our subjects. In all of the comparison cases, the liability
assignments are lower than that assigned to the murder scenario. In scenario 2,
the completed conduct attempted murder case, subjects impose liability of 8.38.
The absence of intended harm, which is the only difference between scenario 1
and scenario 2, generates a reduction in liability of about 1. 7 grades (a 'no-harm
discount' as it might be called.)
Scenario 3 is an attempt case, like scenario 2, but one in which the conduct
is not complete; the actor is stopped before he can shoot, what the common law
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called a 'dangerous proximity' attempt. The subjects give a liability of 7 .33, a
further discount from the failed attempt in scenario 2, where the actor shoots
and misses. It appears that the subjects are giving an additional discount because
the actor is further from commission of the offence; this might be called a
'incomplete-conduct discount'. Tentatively, we might think of this discount as
being added to the no-harm discount
Scenario 4 is the bilateral inchoate conspiracy. The subjects give a reduction
in liability, to 6.06, well below the murder scenario of 10.10. The liability
assigned scenario 4 is also below the liability assigned to scenario 3. This latter
difference may represent an additional incomplete-conduct discount thought
appropriate because the conduct is even further from the completed offence
than in the dangerous proximity attempt in scenario 3.
In scenario 5 the actor is only complicit in murder; the murder occurs but he
is an accomplice rather than the perpetrator of the murder, and is assigned a
liability of 8.60, considerably lower than the liability assigned the murderer in
scenario 1. Such a 'complicity discount' is consistent with an objectivist view of
criminality; the actor appears to have less of a causal responsibility for the death.
Scenario 6 presents the case of failed complicity in murder, assigned a liability
of 6.35. The subjects give a substantial reduction, not only reduced from the
liability of scenario 1 but also from the liability imposed in scenario 2, completed
conduct attempt, and that imposed in scenario 5, complicity. But such greater
reduction is entirely consistent with an objectivist view of criminality. The actor
is not only in the role of accomplice rather than perpetrator, as in scenario 5,
but he also has no actual causal connection with the death; his conduct only
constitutes an attempt, as in scenario 2. Interestingly, it appears that the no-harm
discount and the complicity discount work additively, to provide a cumulative
reduction in punishment.
In scenarios 7 and 8, the intent to kill present in other scenarios is absent;
instead the actor is only reckless as to causing the death. In scenario 7, the
reckless homicide case, the subjects impose liability of 7 .15, a reduction from
the straight murder case in scenario 1. As noted in the analysis in Part 3, we
did not expect the contrast between this scenario and the murder scenario to
distinguish between an objectivist and a subjectivist view of criminality by the
subjects; both views would give reduced liability because of the actor's reduced
level of culpability. These results confirm our prediction of an 'unintended result
discount.'
The comparison of most interest for scenario 7 is with scenario 8. Scenario 8
is the same as scenario 7 except that the harm risked luckily does not come
about. The subjects reduce liability from the 7.15 of scenario 7, to 5.28. This
seems to provide not only an unintended result discount but also the no-harm
discount that we saw in scenario 2. Again, we see that the two discounts appear
to be additive.
To sum up what we found for the grading issues, the patterning of the subjects'
responses to these scenarios is quite consistent and strongly suggests that they
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take an objectivist view of criminality on issues of grading; resulting harm and
the extent of causal contribution to a harm are highly relevant to their assignment
of liability.

(ii) Issues of offence minimum requirements
We tum next to an examination of the remaining scenarios, in which the
issue is the minimum requirements of criminal liability. Recall that in these
cases, there is argument by some that no liability should be imposed. The
objectivist holds that if there was no actual danger of harm occurring, then
no liability ought to generated, even though the actor intended harm. The
subjectivist holds that when a settled intent to do harm is formed, liability
ought to be generated. The pure subjectivist would have the same degree of
liability imposed no matter whether the harm actually occurs and no matter
the actor's causal contribution to it, if any. As noted above, however, the
objectivist-grading subjectivist concedes that the liability generated ought to
depend upon whether the harm actually occurs and the extent of the actor's
causal connection to the harm.
In these minimum requirements comparisons, the subjects show themselves
to be subjectivists, rather than the objectivists that we saw when considering the
grading scenarios. More precisely, they show themselves to be, as a group,
objectivist-grading subjectivist. That is, they take a subjectivist view of minimum
requirements but, in imposing that liability, they reveal their objectivist approach
to grading.
Scenario 9 is the substantial step attempt case. The subjects' assigned liability
averaging 5. 73 sharply reduced from the relevant contrast case of murder. The
fact that any liability is assigned is inconsistent with the objectivist view, which
would have given a complete defence and therefore assign no liability because
there had not yet been any real danger of the offence being committed. We note
that no liability would have been the actual result of application of the common
law test in such a substantial step case.
The reduced liability assigned by the subjects is consistent with the objectivistgrading subjectivist's view. It seems to reflect a no-harm discount and, because
the offence is so far from completion, a double incomplete-conduct discount.
This case is even more distant from a completed offence than the proximity
attempt in scenario 3, hence liability is even lower that the 7.33 in that scenario.
This supports the theory that the subjects as a group are objectivist as to grading,
but subjectivist as to minimum requirements. If their subjectivist minimum
requirements are met, they shift to their objectivist view to determine how much
liability to impose.
Scenario 10 is the completed conduct, factually impossible attempt scenario;
the actor shot a wax dummy in the head, mistaking the dummy for his
enemy. Recall that this is a case that objectivists will be tom over, just as
early common law gave a complete defence but later permitted reduced
liability. It probably will not surprise the reader to learn that the subjects
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assigned an average liability of 7. 94, which is certainly generally inconsistent
with the early common law position of giving a defence, although one subject
gave liability but no punishment. The rather high average liability assigned
in this condition is perhaps something more than one might expect from an
objectivist. 31 It is, however, entirely consistent with the objectivist-grading
subjectivist who, after determining that liability is appropriate because of the
actor's externalized intent, reverts to an objectivist view in determining the
amount of liability. In comparison to the completed conduct (possible) attempt
of scenario 2, which received a liability of 8.38, the results here hint at the
subjects providing an additional discount, beyond that for no harm; they
seem to be giving a discount that takes account of the factual impossibility
of actually causing the intended harm. However, the reliability of the difference
between these two cases is marginal (P=0.07).
Scenario 11 is a unilateral inchoate conspiracy case; the co-conspirator is
an undercover police officer. The subjects give liability of 6.29. This is
inconsistent with the objectivist view, which would give a complete defence.
The imposition of liability by the subjects is consistent with the objectivistgrading subjectivist's view. Again it does not follow the pure subjectivist
pattern of having no reduction in liability from the prototypic murder case.
Instead, it reflects ·the view of a subjectivist who, after determining that the
minimum requirements of liability are satisfied, shifts to an objectivist view
in judging the amount of liability to impose. The extent of liability is slightly
below that imposed in scenario 9 (P= 0.03); both deserve a no-harm discount
as well as a double incomplete-conduct discount. Conspiracy to murder is
not murder.
An interesting comparison for the unilateral conspiracy case is scenario 4, an
analogous conspiracy case, but one in which the co-conspirator is real, not a
police officer. The status of the co-conspirator is irrelevant to the subjectivist,
because it is outside the knowledge of the actor. Our subjects assigned nearly
equivalent liability to the two cases (actually slightly but not reliably higher for
the unilateral conspirator) which is what one would expect from a subjectivist
view.
Scenarios 12 and 13 involve a drug smuggling offence rather than murder,
and thus are not to be compared to any of the other scenarios. In scenario 12,
the offender smuggles cocaine and receives a liability of 7.40. In scenario 13,
which is identical but for the fact that, unknown to the actor, the powder he
31
The concerns that the objectivist is struggling to express, and the reasons for her discomfort, are revealed in
Norman Finkel, Stephan Maloney, Monique Vailbuena, and Jennifer Groscup, 'Lay Perspectives on Legal
Conundrums: Impossible and Mistaken Act Cases' 19 Law and Human Behavior 59~08 (1995). Using a scenario
methodology and varying the impossible act cases, they demonstrate that, if the perpetrator completes an act that
any reasonable person would agree was going to bring about the death of the victim, judgments of 'guilty' are
made even if that act did not in fact bring about death. (They did not have their subjects assign degrees of liability,
so we cannot tell if some of those judgments of 'guilty' would have Jed to reduced punishments.) However, when
the act the perpetrator completed was not one that a reasonable person would think would be effective in bringing
about death, then judgments of 'guilty' were infrequent. The scenario that most clearly makes this point is one in
whim the perpetrator attempted to bring about death by sticking pins into a wax effigy of the intended victim.
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smuggles is not illegal drugs but talcum powder, liability drops to 5.06. The fact
that substantial liability is imposed by the subjects is inconsistent with an
objectivist view, which would give a complete defence. The subjects' response
is consistent with an objectivist-grading subjectivist's view. The reduction we see
here is similar to the no-harm plus impossibility reduction that we first saw in
scenario 10, a bit more than two grades. Again, the pure subjectivist would give
no reduction.
Scenario 14 is the case that seemed to try our subjects' analytic thinking (or
possibly their patience) most. Recall that the case involves a belief by the actor
that he is being an accomplice to murder, when it turns out that he is actually
giving a glin to a person who uses it to kill another in self defence. The subjects
assign a liability of 9.0. This is inconsistent with the objectivist view, which
would give a complete defence because the case is analogous to that of a legally
impossible attempt in the sense that the actor mistakenly believes that the
circumstances are such that he is committing an offence when in fact he is
mistaken about the circumstances. From the objectivist perspective, his conduct
is entirely lawful; it is only from his mistaken view of the circumstances that his
conduct would be seen as an offence.
But neither does the case seem to be graded according to the objectivistgrading subjectivist's view, which we have seen reflected in all of the previous
:::ases. Under that view, the actor probably would have been entitled to both a
:::omplicity discount and a no-harm discount, in other words, liability in the
range of 7 rather than the 9.0 that the subjects in fact assign. That is, subjects
1re treating the death as an actual harm for which the actor deserves punishment,
:ather than a justified harm that was entirely lawful.
How did our subjects think about this case? We were sufficiently interested
n determining this that we asked 10 new subjects to react to this case along
IIlith scenario 5, the case of complicity to murder; recall that in both cases
he actor gives the perpetrator a gun, intending to assist the perpetrator in
nurdering the other. In both cases the other is killed; in one it turns out to
Je in self-defence, in the other murder. But, and obviously, the two cases
lre identical from the perspective of the actor on whom we focus. Subjects
nade their liability assignments, and we interviewed them about how they
:aw the two cases. Subjects had trouble with this comparison, because they
vere tom between the two conflicting considerations, considerations that they
·ecognized and articulated. Because they were compelled by the fact that the
LCt was an identical one from the perspective of the actor, two of the ten
ubjects gave the two cases identical and high liabilities. The other eight
ubjects recognized this, but also recognized that the resultant killing was
elf-defence in one case, and reduced the liability they assigned (usually a
me grade reduction, occasionally a little more) without being able to articulate
. reason for this other than they thought the actor should 'get a little
eduction' from the prototypic case. The force of the subjectivist perspective
~ revealed here, but the typical result makes the case inconsistent with the
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pure subjectivist view, which would be to give no discount. Instead, our
subjects reverted to the objectivist view in grading. 32
To review these minimal requirement contrasts, the subjects as a group take
the objectivist-grading subjectivist view, using subjectivist criteria to determine
whether liability should be imposed but reducing that liability as a grading
objectivist would, giving discounts for no harm, complicity, impossibility, incomplete conduct, and unintended consequences.

(iii) An analysis of response patterns of individual subjects
The previous section has examined the responses of the subjects as a group and
that examination has painted a relatively clear picture of our subjects as objectively
grading subjectivists. But we worried that treating the subjects as a group might
hide important differences among the subjects as individuals. We wondered, for
example, whether the group means might be the result of a majority of objectivegrading subjectivists outvoting a minority of pure subjectivists, or pure objectivists. Or, perhaps, the objective-grading subjectivists were not really the bulk
of the group; perhaps the means simply reflected shifting majorities among polar
opposites of pure subjectivists and pure objectivists. In fact, our examination of
the subjects' responses as individuals did reveal a picture that is slightly different
in important ways.
Most of the grading scenarios still suggested a strong objectivist view. The
vast majority of the subjects gave reduced liability (compared to the control case
of scenario I) in scenarios 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7: 90%, 98%, 98%, 96%, and 98%
of the subjects, respectively. Of course, this means that up to 10% of the subjects
gave no reduction, the subjectivist view.
The subjectivist view, while still a minority view, seemed to be stronger in two
scenarios in particular. In scenario 5, complicity in murder, only 65% of the
subjects gave reduced liability; thus 35% thought the complicity ought to be
equivalent in liability to murder. Also interesting is scenario 8, in which 58% of
the subjects gave reduced liability, but 42% did not. That 42% of the subjects
did not reduce liability is a bit of a surprise. No jurisdiction grades endangerment,
simple risk-creation, the same as manslaughter, recklessly causing a death. We
did not predict either of these results. It would be interesting to learn more in
future research about that substantial minority of the subjects who disagreed
with the majority view and who believed that complicity and lack of a harm
from risk-taking ought not to reduce liability.
The minimum requirements scenarios also offered some surprises when the
individual subject responses were examined. A majority of subjects performed
in a way consistent with the picture offered by the means analysis above. That
is, a majority of subjects showed a subjectivist view in imposing liability but
32

It is not entirely clear to us why the original subjects of the larger study did not see the need for reduction
that our later subjects saw. Perhaps we asked too much of them in making the complex calculation, and in
expecting their response to match all other scenarios as they would have wanted. When faced with the sinJple
comparison of just two scenarios, in the second testing, their task was easier and their decision clearer.
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switched to an objectivist view in grading. However, a few pure objectivists did
exist. In each of the minimum requirements scenarios, a few subjects assigned
either a rating of 'no liability', or 'liability but no prison sentence'.
In scenario 9, the substantial step murder attempt, four persons, or 8% of the
sample, showed an objectivist assignment of no liability; three others generated
the complex judgment that the attempter was liable, but should be assigned no
punishment. 33 In scenario 11, the unilateral inchoate conspiracy, three subjects
assigned no liability and two more assigned liability but no punishment, a total
of 10% of the subjects. Perhaps most interesting, in scenario 13, the legally
impossible attempt to smuggle cocaine (that was actually talcum powder), a
majority imposed a substantial punishment, but 23% (11 people) gave the
objectivist response: six no liability and five no punishment. In its weakest
showing, the objectivist-grading subjectivist view was held by only 77% of the
sample.
One more aspect of the data warrants examination. Do our individual subjects
show a consistent view in their responses? That is, if an individual gives, for
instance, an objectivist response. 34 to one scenario, is he or she also likely to give
an objectivist response to other scenarios? The answer is 'yes'; the data indicate
moderate consistency among subjects. As mentioned before, seven subjects gave
the pure objectivist response to the minimum requirements scenario 9. All of
the subjects who gave a pure objectivist response to scenarios 10 and 11 were
drawn from that group of seven. Five out of that seven also gave the pure
objectivist response to scenario 13. Clearly, a small subset of our sample tended
towards objectivist responses on minimum requirements scenarios. These might
be called 'pure objectivists' because, like the majority, they also gave objective
responses in the grading scenarios.
Did we find any 'pure subjectivists', persons who gave not only the usual
subjectivist responses to minimum requirements cases but also to grading cases?
Yes. One consistent subjectivist and other occasional subjectivists. That is, one
subject assigned liabilities identical to the liability he gave to the murder case to
scenarios 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11! As far as this subject was concerned, shooting
to kill and missing, or aiming the gun and being stopped by a security guard,
or shooting a wax doll mistaken for the target ought to generate the same liability
as killing, as should conspiring to kill the other, whether unilateral or bilateral,
and as should buying a gun for the purpose of killing the other. Four other
mbjects joined this one, thus 10% of the sample, in assigning similar liabilities
to the murder scenario and the shooting to kill but missing scenario (scenarios
1 and 2). Four different subjects joined the first one, again, 10% of the sample,
in assigning an identical liability to murder and shooting a wax figure mistaken
for the target (scenarios 1 and 10).
33
For a discussion of the interesting implications of a subject's use of the 'liability but no punishment' verdict,
;ee Robinson and Darley, above n. 20 at 210--12.
34
For the purposes of this discussion, we define an objectivist response as one that assigned either the 'no
iability' or the 'liability but no punishment' verdict.
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To summarize, while the vast majority took an objectivist view of grading, a
small minority took a subjectivist view in some cases (only one subject was
consistently a grading subjectivist). Two of the grading scenarios (complicity
and endangerment) revealed a more substantial minority of grading subjectivists.
While the vast majority of subjects took a subjectivist view of minimum requirements (with objectivist grading again, of course), a small minority of pure
objectivists seemed to exist.

B. Implications of the Results for the Questions Presented
Recall the questions presented at the conclusion of Pan 1:
(1) Do people take an objectivist view, as the common law did, on both
grading and minimum requirements issues, or do they prefer a subjectivist view,
as modem criminal codes seem to? That is, are people of today Fletcher's
'traditionalists' or, as Fletcher would seem to predict by his labeling, 'modernists'?
(2) Are people consistent in the view they take? That is, do they stick to an
objectivist view, or a subjectivist view, in a variety of situations? Or do they
switch back and forth in a way that suggests that they cannot properly be
characterized as taking either view?
(3) If people are not consistently 'traditionalists' or 'modernists', as Fletcher
predicts, is there nonetheless a discernible pattern in their use of an objectivist
or a subjectivist view? Do people take a subjectivist view in judging the minimum
requirements for liability and an objectivist view in grading, as we hypothesize?
Or does the pattern follow a different principle? Or, is there no underlying
pattern to peoples' liability preferences, as some writers would seem to expect?
The reader now knows from our description of results that most lay persons
today are neither 'modernists' or 'traditionalists', as Fletcher seems to assume,
and certainly they are not 'modernists', as that label predicts. There does appear
to be a consistent pattern in the typical subject's views: a subjectivist view in
judging the minimum requirements of liability, but a shift to an objectivist view
in assessing the proper grade of an offence. This was the pattern we hypothesized.
When it comes to setting the minimal requirements for conduct to count as
a crime, the vast majority of subjects take a subjectivist view: a person who
intends to commit a crime, and carries out conduct towards the direction of
committing that crime, is assigned criminal liability, even when the crime and
the harm does not ensue and even when it would have been impossible to ensue.
In determining how much liability to impose upon the offender, however, the
subjects were acutely sensitive to such considerations as whether the harm
actually occurred, whether the actions intended to bring about that harm were
complete or incomplete, and the strength of the actor's causal connection with
the harm, including whether the actor was the perpetrator or only an accomplice.
They certainly did not agree with the core proposition of the subjectivist view
on grading, that forming an intent to commit harm is always morally equivalent
to causing that harm, and should generate equivalent liability.
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C. Modeling the Liability Assignments: the Discounting Dynamic
To give a better sense of the patterning of our subjects' judgments, we sketch a
set of liability assignment rules that are consistent with our findings and that
produce liability assignments similar to those given by the subjects. (As the
empirically trained reader will recognize, it is always the case that a number of
conceptual models can be generated that could fit the existing data patterns.)
In the model we propose, the liability assignment process would begin with the
concept of the prototypical crime, in this case of murder, and the appropriate
sentence for that crime. The differing sentences for prototypes of differing crimes
is not something we have investigated in detail in the present research, but the
idea is generally accepted. Some offences are more 'serious' than others and
deserve higher sentences. Murder deserves a greater punishment than theft, or
as in our study, murder deserves and gets a higher punishment than cocaine
smuggling. 35
Various classes of deviations from the prototype would cause a reduction in
sentence. In this study, which considers cases that lie on the borderlines between
some of the most complex issues in criminal law theory, we found that five kinds
of discounts were sufficient to represent all of the deviations from prototype: a
no-harm discount, an incomplete-conduct discount, a complicity discount, an
unintended result discount, and an impossibility discount. Table III shows how
these five discounts, combined in different ways, can account for the variations
in means seen in the subjects' liability responses.
The apparent additive nature of the various discounts is an interesting implication of this study's results, and future research might test it further. Are
such 'discounts' additive in other situations? Is the proportion of discount similar
in different situations, or is it entirely situationally dependent? Although this
study was not designed for the purpose, we might thought it interesting to try
to examine these questions with our current data.
By comparing cases which differed only on one of the kinds of discounts, we
can examine the magnitude of the discount that the subjects judged appropriate.
Column 3 of Table III lists some of the comparisons possible. For some of the
discounts, we were able to derive more than one estimate of the discount from
the data. For instance, the non-occurrence of the harm, what Table III refers to
as the 'no-harm discount', can be estimated by contrasts between scenarios 1
and 2, but also by scenarios 5 and 6, and scenarios 7 and 8. If we had multiple
estimates of a discount, we averaged them. These average discount estimates
are shown in Table IV, column 5.
As can be seen when multiple estimates are possible, the different estimates
of the discounts vary considerably. This, then, suggests our first conclusion:
something about the specific circumstances in which the discount is instantiated
seems to make a difference in the degree of sentence reduction from the prototype
35
For a discussion of the seriousness of the offence as a determinant of liability, see Robinson and Darley,
above n. 20 at 158-9, 224-5.
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Table III. A discounting model of grading
Scenario

Mean

Implication of comparisons

(1) Murder
(2) Completed conduct attempted
murder
(3) Incomplete conduct
(proximity) attempt in murder

10.10
8.38

[control case]
vs (1): no-harm discount

(4) Bilateral inchoate conspiracy

6.06

(5) Complicity in murder
(6) Failed complicity in murder

8.60
6.35

7.33

(7) Manslaughter (reckless
homicide)
(8) Endangerment

7.15

(9) Incomplete conduct
(substantial step) attempt to
murder

5.73

(10) Completed conduct factually
impossible attempted murder

7.94

(11) Unilateral inchoate conspiracy

6.29

( 12) Smuggling cocaine
(13) Legally impossible attempt to
smuggle cocaine
(14) Mistaken belief of complicity
in murder

7.40
5.06

5.28

9.0

*But see text discussion concerning scenario 14.

vs (1): no harm+incompleteconduct discount
vs (2): incomplete-conduct
discount
vs (1): no-harm+double
incomplete-conduct discount
vs (3): additional incompleteconduct discount
vs (1): complicity discount
vs (1): no-harm+complicity
discount
vs (5): no-harm discount (no
causal connection with harm)
vs (1): unintended result discount
vs ( 1): unintended result+ no
harm discount
vs (7): no harm discount
vs (1): no-harm+double
incomplete-conduct discount
vs (2): double incomplete-conduct
discount
vs (3): incomplete-conduct
discount
vs ( 1): no-harm +impossibility
discount
vs (2): impossibility discount
vs (1): no-harm+double
incomplete-conduct discount
vs (4): analogous discounts
[control case]
vs (12): no-harm+impossibility
discount
vs (5): similar means, suggesting
that only complicity discount given
(no no-harm discount given)*
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Table IV. Estimate of discount size

Discount

Estimate 1

No-harm
Complicity
Unintended result
Impossibility
Incomplete conduct

1.72
1.50
2.95
2.34
1.05

(1 v 2)
(1 v 5)
(1 v 7)
(12 v 13)
(2 v 3)

Estimate 2

Estimate 3

Average

0.25 (5 v 6)*

1.87 (7 v 8)

0.44 (2 v 10)
1.27 (3 v 4)

1.6 (3 v 9)

1.28
1.50
2.95
1.39
1.31

* This is a scenario where the harm does occur but the actor has no causal connection to it. Perhaps
this difference is important to the subjects.
NB: The parentheticals indicate the two scenarios whose liability results are compared in order to
generate the value of the discount.

that the subjects assigned; the amount of a discount given seems to be to
some extent situationally dependent. What variations in circumstance 'make a
difference' to our subjects is a question for further research; the study we report
here, it will be recalled, was not designed to quantify discounts.
Another conclusion suggested by Table IV is that four of the five discounts
each seem to be of approximately the same amount, something more than one
but less than two. Remember that each point on the liability scale represented
approximately one offence grade in a typical American criminal code, and that
the difference between points was different; the higher on the scale the greater
difference, each point essentially doubling the punishment. The similarity in the
amount of the discounts in light of the exponential nature of the scale seems to
confirm that people tend to think in punishment differences in such exponential
terms. 36 The unintended result discount was much larger than the others,
suggesting that the absence of intention was a more powerful discount than the
other sources of discount presented in the scenarios.
To test the effectiveness of the 'discounting' system as a model for our subjects
responses, we compared the actual results against the results that would be
generated by a system that used only our hypothesized discounting system. For
example, in a very rough approximation, one could assign each discount a value
of 1.5 points on the liability scale (representing a point somewhere between 1
and 2, as four of the five discounts seem to fall). Applying this value to the
scenario formulae given in Table III, column 3, the results are represented by
the line labeled '1.5 grade' in Figure 1.

36

For a discussion of the tendency of people to think in terms of exponential penalty amounts, see RE. Harlow,

J.M. Darley, and P.H. Robinson, 'The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach
for Obtaining Community Perceptions' 11 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 71-95 (1995).
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Discounting models for murder cases.

For a slightly more accurate model, we used the single discount estimates
developed in Table IV. These average values, different for each kind of discount,
were then used in the formulae in Table III, column 3. For instance, scenario
11, as contrasted with scenario 1, receives both a no-harm and a double
incomplete-conduct discount. The average no-harm discount is 1.28; the average
incomplete conduct discount is 1.31, doubled it is 2.62. We then summed those
two discounts, and subtracted the result from the 10.10 liability assignment
given to scenario 1, giving a predicted liability of 6.20. (The actual liability given
by subjects for the scenario was 6.29.) The results of this process, done for all
of the scenarios, are shown by the line labeled 'estimated averaged' in Figure 1.
There are several results to notice from this figure. Initially, puzzlingly, even
for the model that estimated each discount separately, there is occasionally a
noticeable difference in the liability assigned by it to the scenarios with single
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discounts from the liability actually given by the subjects. This is so because the
modeled liabilities are sometimes averaged ones, and as we noted above, they
differ from the specific ones assigned to specific instances. So, for instance, the
estimated average model prediction for scenario 2 somewhat underestimates the
actual discount the subjects gave that case.
Overall, we are struck by the degree to which either version of the additive
discount model does a good job of modeling the data. Again, the study was not
designed to derive a model for the psychological processes the subjects used to
generate their liability judgments. We would argue that the discounting model
receives sufficient support from our after-the-fact modeling to warrant testing in
future research. Its central notion, that liabilities are generated by considering
crime prototypes, and the number of differences between the actual case and the
prototype, represented in terms of five discounting principles, seems intriguing. If
validated, it is a formulation that could be used to generate a viable and
conceptually understandable set of sentencing guidelines. 37

5. Conclusion
A. Lim£tations of the Study
To begin, we ought to acknowledge the limits of the generalizations that can be
drawn from any one study, and particularly the one study we did. Four potential
limitations are important to note. First, while we wish our results to be about
different liability views toward crimes in general, we presented our subjects with
scenarios about mainly, but not solely, one crime, the crime of murder. Of
course, we made that choice deliberately; murder is the crime that is likely to
attract the most severe liability judgments from subjects, and we wished to give
room for large changes in liability judgments if the circumstantial variations were
perceived by subjects as major mitigations. And we note that we found these
major mitigations; some subjects judged the protagonist 'not guilty' in some
scenarios and imposed life sentences in other scenarios. Still, the patterning of
judgments in which the core crime is other than murder needs to be explored.
Second, and closely related to the first point, when we created, for instance,
the scenario for the factually impossible attempt case, we created only one such
scenario, but one can see that there can be a family of such cases. Again, and
of course, we created the one we did because it was the one we found the most
relevant. The perpetrator shot at a wax dummy made to look like the intended
victim because the police were concerned about possible attacks on the intended
37
This discounting conceptualization is presently part of the framework of the United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines. The basic structure of the guidelines is for each offence or suboffence to have a base
punishment 'level', which is then adjusted according to the presence of various factors. Thus, an actor's role in
the offence as a minor accomplice reduces the actor's guideline sentence by one or more levels from the offence's
base level. See United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines s. 3B 1.2. Similarly, an inchoate offence is reduced
in level from that of the substantive offence. Ibid at s. 2Xl.l. One of us served as one of the original Commissioners
who created the structure of the current guidelines.

AUTUMN 1998

Objectivist vs Subjectivist Vzews of Criminality

441

victim. We wanted to compare this scenario to others in which the actor similarly
intended harm and acted to cause it. Certainly, a very different liability assignment
would be given to an impossible attempt case in which the perpetrator made a
wax dummy of the intended victim and shot it, thinking that somehow this
would kill the victim! 38 Further research, driven by theoretical considerations for
varying the exact content of the scenarios, will extend the generalizations that
can be made and certainly qualify them in interesting ways.
Third, we employed what is called a within-subjects research design; each
subject rated every scenario. In this sort of design, the subjects can become
aware of the theoretical issues that generated the differences among the scenarios.
We were careful to instruct the subjects that we did not always expect differences
between stories to produce differences between their liability judgments, and
the reader will recall that subjects did not always treat different scenarios
differently; subjects sometimes rated two scenarios as deserving identical liabilities. Still, it is possible that subjects who are alerted to a particular distinction
then decide the distinction is important, but would not have found it important
without being alerted to it. Future research, using designs in which a single
subject responds to a single case, or a limited number of cases, can investigate
this latter possibility. For this first exploration of the topic, we judged the
advantages of the within-subjects design, and particularly its unparalleled ability
to detect the pattern of judgments given by each individual subject, great enough
to make its use appropriate.
Fourth, one can raise concerns about the degree to which our sample of
subjects does a good job of standing in for the vast population of citizens whose
views are relevant to the debate among the issues that we discuss. But the
question here is different from the standard questions one asks about samples
and populations. In the standard survey, one wishes to generalize about, for
instance, what percentage of the population will assign the death penalty to the
perpetrator of the murder described. To establish that percentage accurately,
large and carefully stratified samples are necessary. But that is not the sort of
generalization we wish to draw. We are instead concerned with the patterning
of the different liability assignments made by each individual, and the similarity
of the resulting pattern across individuals.
We actually have evidence about both sorts of differences among our subjects,
because we had two different sorts of people who responded to our scenarios:
students and jury-qualified residents of the town. A difference of the first sort
was actually found; students tended to assign slightly more lenient punishments
than did citizens. But we did not find a difference of the second sort; the pattern
of differences in the liability assignments did not differ between students and
citizens. This possibility of analysing patterns is provided by the within-subjects
character of the experimental design, and represents a strength of that design.
Again, future research will search for important differences in patterning among
38

This, among other things, is what is demonstrated in the Finkel et al. research, above n. 31.
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broad samples of subjects, perhaps following up on the discovery of what seemed
to be a small but interesting group of people who gave strong objectivist responses
throughout and another group that gave subjectivist responses throughout.

B. Implications for Existing Criminal Law
If our characterization of present lay judgements is correct, and if we are correct
in arguing, as we will argue in a moment, that the criminal law ought to mirror
the shared intuitions of justice of the community, then both common law rules
and modem criminal codes are flawed in that they deviate from our subjects'
intuitions. First, the results suggest that the common law doctrines no longer
reflect community views, if they ever did. Most importantly, the doctrines that
define the minimum requirements of liability at common law draw that liability
too narrowly, excluding from liability a variety of actors who today's lay persons
see as deserving of criminal liability. The actor whose attempt conduct falls short
of 'dangerous proximity', the actor whose criminal agreement is only 'unilateral'
because, for example, he or she conspires with an undercover agent, and the
actor who mistakenly believes that he or she has committed an offence, because
of a mistake as to an existing circumstance, such as a belief that the talcum
powder was d~gs, all would get a complete defence at common law, but our
subjects thought that some liability and punishment was appropriate. 39
On the other hand, our results suggest that modem codes also miss the mark
on important issues. Modem codes generally do a good job in determining the
cases in which to assign liability, but fail to acknowledge the importance of many
factors that lay persons today think important in determining the amount of
punishment deserved. In particular, modem codes sometimes fail to adjust
offence grade according to whether the offence harm actually occurs, how far
the actor's inchoate conduct has proceeded towards the completed offence,
whether the offender was only an accomplice rather than a perpetrator, and
whether the offence contemplated by the actor was possible for him or her to
commit actually, when our subjects clearly would. 40
It may well be that individual judges, who may share community intuitions,
will use their sentencing discretion to override the grading distinctions of the
code and impose a sentence that reflects the community's view of criminality.
But this, we think, is no proper solution to the problem of improper code grading
for several reasons. First, many sentencing judges may not share the intuitions
of the community. 41 Spending one's days watching a parade of criminals appear
for sentencing may well alter one's views of proper punishment to be imposed.
Second, even if all judges did share the community's objectivist view of grading,
the availability of sentencing discretion creates other serious problems. It is out
39
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of recognition of these problems that the USA is presently in the midst of a
wave of sentencing reform manifested primarily in the introduction of sentencing
guidelines that reduce judicial discretion.
The press for sentencing guidelines comes from several concerns. Perhaps
most importantly, unguided sentencing discretion is likely to generate disparate
sentences in similar cases. Different judges have different sentencing philosophies.
Some may think general deterrence the most important goal to pursue in a case;
others may think rehabilitation the most important goal in an identical case. Still
others may think the potential for future offences the most important factor in
the same case; others still may think that the punishment deserved for this
offence is central in determining the sentence. Other judges may look at the
same facts and conclude that some combination of these factors and goals is the
best criterion for determining the sentence. Without commitment to a single
sentencing theory for a particular kind of case, it seems hard to see how the
sentences of different judges could be similar. 42 A further concern about unguided
sentencing discretion is the potential for abuse of that discretion, including abuse
by the use of improper factors or by conscious or subconscious expression of
racial, religious, gender, or other bias.
The trend in modem code drafting, evidenced in the Model Penal Code, is
to move toward a subjectivist view of both minimal requirements and grading.
These two tendencies, taken together, achieve a sentencing philosophy that is
simple to apply, but rather draconian in effect, and quite strongly in conflict
with the sentencing patterns shown by our subjects. Our subjects did not treat
cases of an externalized intent to commit a crime as equivalent in liability to
cases in which the commission of that crime was completed. Instead they were
influenced in their liability. judgments by variations in the objective circumstances
surrounding the crime: the extent of the actor's causal contribution, how close
to completion of the offence the actor came, and the occurrence of harm.
This means that a jurisdiction that moves toward the subjectivist sentencing
philosophy of the Model Penal Code is a jurisdiction that moves away from a
legal code that embodies the moral intuitions of its citizens. This does not seem
to us to be a very wise move to make, for three related reasons. First, for those
who think that just deserts represents the preferred mode of distributing criminal
liability, the intuitions of the community have a considerable claim to be
considered when codes are adopted, and without evidence such as we have
generated, any code adopted is unable to give standing to these community
intuitions. The code drafters often refer to their speculations about community
moral intuitions, indicating that they do think them relevant, and often get them
wrong.
Second, as we have argued more fully elsewhere, there is a utilitarian argument
for having legal codes that in the main model community intuitions. Where the
42
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criminal law commands the respect of the community it governs, the law's moral
credibility itself provides a reason for law abidingnessY
Third, as other studies have demonstrated recently, people tend to assume
that legal codes conform to their moral intuitions. 44 This is not a surprising
result if one asks what information people have available for inferring the content
of codes; they have very little information other than their own intuitions: very
little information is made public about the content of criminal codes, and very
little attempt is made by code drafters to educate the public about code content.
If the codes are in fact far distant from the moral judgments that people use to
intuit the content of criminal codes, then people will be seriously confused
about the actual content of the codes. This means that a counterintuitive law,
unpublicized, fails to serve its ex ante function. It does not provide a clear guide
according to which people can govern their conduct in the future. 45
Earlier, we noted, and supported, a trend towards articulated sentencing rules.
As is now clear, we argue that, as sentencing rules become more articulated and
less discretionary, it becomes more important for those rules to reflect the
objectivist grading intuitions of the community. Sentencing guidelines that
embody the subjectivist views of grading typical of many modern criminal
codes-such as provisions setting the grade of inchoate conduct as the same
grade as that for the substantive offence-would generate sentences likely to
undercut the criminal justice system's moral credibility with the public. We
support the need for more articulated sentencing criteria, but that improvement
increases the need to ensure that the system's rules more accurately reflect the
community's views than they have in the past.
To sum up our argument: for all of the reasons that we have detailed, we cannot
yet assume that our results' pattern is a perfect representation of community
sentiments, although we would be surprised to discover that it was seriously
deviant from them. But assuming that our results hold in future research, for
all of the reasons we just presented, we advocate adopting a criminal code that
mirrors them; we advocate adopting a criminal code that matches the moral
intuitions of the community it governs. That entails adopting a criminal code
that reflects the subjectivist views of criminality in the definition of minimum
requirements for a crime and the objectivist views of criminality in the assignments
of grading liability levels. Such a community-standards-based code would be a
consistent and coherent one, and one that we think would increase the system's
reputation for doing justice, which in turn eventually would serve to reduce
crime.
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Appendix: The Scenarios
Each scenario is based on the actions of John, who is a 25-year-old man.
During his teenage years, his father, a famously ambitious businessman, rapidly
accumulated a great deal of money. The criminal justice system, after several
investigations, prosecuted and eventually convicted John's father for income tax
evas1on.
1. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of John's
father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his
father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. John buys an easily
concealed gun, planning to confront and kill Paul in the parking lot of his office.
As prosecutor Paul approaches his car in the parking lot of his office, John,
standing several yards away, shoots and kills him.

2. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of John's
father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his
father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. John buys an easily
concealed gun, planning to confront and kill Paul in the parking lot of his office.
As prosecutor Paul approaches his car in the parking lot of his office, John,
standing several yards away, shoots at him but misses. The sound of the gunfire
draws security guards, who arrest John before he can get another shot at Paul.
3. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of John's
father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his
father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. He buys an easily
concealed gun, planning to confront and kill Paul in the parking lot of his office.
As prosecutor Paul approaches his car, John, standing several yards away, aims
at him intending to kill him. Before he can pull the trigger, however, an astute
security guard grabs the gun and arrests John.
4. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution ofJohn's
father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his
father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. He searches for another
person to help him to kill Paul and finds an ex-convict who is also angry at Paul.
John suggests to him that they obtain a gun, confront Paul in the parking lot of
his office, and use the gun to kill Paul. The ex-convict agrees. Their planning
is overheard and reported to police. They are stopped by the police and arrested
on their way to obtain the gun.
5. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of John's
father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his
father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. Before he can act,
however, John hears that his brother is planning to confront prosecutor Paul in
the parking lot of his office. John decides that he will find a gun and bring it to
his brother at the parking lot, in the hope that his brother will use it to shoot
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Paul. He arrives just in time to see his brother hiding, waiting for Paul. He gives
his brother the gun. His brother uses it to shoot Paul dead. The sound of the
gunfire draws security guards, who arrest John and his brother.
6. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution ofJohn's
father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his
father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. Before he can act,
however, John hears that his brother is planning to confront prosecutor Paul in
the parking lot of his office. John decides that he will find a gun and bring it to
his brother at the parking lot, in the hope that his brother will use it to shoot
Paul. He arrives just in time to see his brother hiding, waiting for Paul. Before
he can give his brother the gun, his brother draws a gun from his own coat and
shoots Paul dead. The sound of the gunfire draws security guards, who arrest
John and his brother.
7. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of John's
father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his
father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. John buys an easily
concealed gun, planning to confront and kill Paul in the parking lot of his office.
As prosecutor Paul approaches his car in the parking lot of his office, John,
standing several yards away, shoots at Paul with the intention of missing but
scaring him, which he does. Unfortunately, the shot ricochets off a car and
strikes and kills a woman nearby. The sound of the gunfire draws security guards,
who arrest John.
8. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of John's
father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his
father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. John buys an easily
concealed gun, planning to confront and kill Paul in the parking lot of his office.
As prosecutor Paul approaches his car in the parking lot of his office, John,
standing several yards away, shoots at Paul with the intention of missing but
scaring him, which he does. The sound of the gunfire draws security guards,
who arrest John.
9. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of John's
father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both his
father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. He plans to buy an
easily concealed gun and to confront prosecutor Paul in the parking lot of his
office, where he will shoot him dead. He leaves a note to his brother describing
the details of his plan, but the note is unexpectedly found and read by another
person who notifies police. The police find John coming out of the gun store
mentioned in the note, carrying the gun described in the note as the gun he
planned to buy.
10. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of
fohn's father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both
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his father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. He buys a gun and
approaches Paul as he sits in his car in the parking lot of his office. Standing
several yards away, John shoots and kills him, or so he thinks. The police
immediately arrest John. It turns out that the police had feared such an attack
and had placed a life-like dummy in the driver's seat of Paul's car to serve as a
diversion. The police had Paul exit on the other side of the building and drove
him home under guard.
11. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of
John's father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both
his father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. He searches for
another person to help him to kill Paul and finds an ex-convict who also is angry
at Paul. John suggests to him that they obtain a gun, confront Paul in the parking
lot of his office, and use the gun to kill Paul. The ex-convict agrees. They are
stopped by police on their way to obtain the gun. It turns out that the 'exconvict' is an undercover police agent, who also reported John's plan to the
police.
12. John decides to make a lot of money quickly by illegally smuggling cocaine
into the USA. He buys two kilos of cocaine during a trip to Columbia, intending
to sell it to dealers in New York. At customs in New York, however, his cache
of drugs is discovered, and he confesses his plan to police.
13. John decides to make a lot of money quickly by illegally smuggling cocaine
into the USA. He buys two kilos of cocaine during a trip to Columbia, intending
to sell it to dealers in New York. At customs in New York, however, his cache
of drugs is discovered, and he confesses his plan to police. To his surprise, when
the seized powder is tested, it is discovered that it is only talcum powder; he
had been tricked by his sellers in Columbia.
14. John is angry with prosecutor Paul for Paul's vigorous prosecution of
John's father for income tax evasion. John feels the prosecution has ruined both
his father's life and his own, and is intent on taking revenge. John buys an easily
concealed gun, planning to confront and kill Paul in the parking lot of his office.
He arrives just in time to see his brother hiding waiting for Paul. He gives his
brother the gun. His brother uses it to shoot Paul dead. The sound of the gunfire
draws security guards, who arrest John and his brother. Only later does John
learn that Paul, apparently angry at insults from John's brother, had attacked
his brother with a knife and was about ready to attack him again. His brother's
shooting of Paul is held to be lawful self-defence.

